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It is well-known that the problem of recognizing an ESS in a symmetric bimatrix game is coNP-
complete. In this paper, we show that recognizing an ESS even in doubly symmetric bimatrix
games is also coNP-complete. Our result further implies that recognizing asymptotically stable
equilibria of the replicator dynamic in this class of games is also a coNP-complete problem.
1 Introduction
The theory of evolution, as that was formulated by Darwin, has had a profound impact in the
sciences, not only in biology but also in the social sciences and economics. From a mathematical
perspective, evolutionary theory relies on the framework of noncooperative games. From such
an analytical perspective, evolutionary theory can be approached either from the perspective of
notions of evolutionary stability [Maynard Smith and Price, 1973, Maynard Smith, 1982] or that of
evolutionary dynamics (such as the replicator dynamic of Taylor and Jonker [1978]).
In this paper, we examine theories of evolution from a computational complexity perspective.
Etessami and Lochbihler [2008] and Nisan [2006] have cast doubt that the notion of evolutionary
stability can serve as a general foundation of evolutionary theories unless P = NP, by showing
that the problem of recognizing an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is coNP-complete. This
result applies to the general class of symmetric bimatrix games.
Restricting the problem to the class of doubly symmetric (coordination) games (that is, sym-
metric bimatrix games where the payoff matrix is symmetric), one would perhaps expect that such a
detection problem becomes computationally tractable as coordination games were recently strongly
tied to Darwin’s theory of evolution: Chastain et al. [2014] view evolution as a coordination game
solved by a multiplicative weights algorithm akin to the replicator dynamic (cf. [Arora et al., 2012])
(see also [Mehta et al., 2015]). Alas, we show that the problem remains coNP-complete even in
symmetric coordination games. Since a strategy in such a coordination game is an ESS if and only it
is asymptotically stable under the replicator dynamic [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988], the problem
of detecting asymptotically stable equilibria of the replicator dynamic is also coNP-complete.
2 Preliminaries
The ESS is a refinement of the symmetric Nash equilibrium in symmetric bimatrix games. Let us,
therefore, start off by introducing game-theoretic concepts in this setting.
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2.1 Nash equilibria
A 2-player (bimatrix) game in normal form is specified by a pair of n×m matrices A and B, the
former corresponding to the row player and the latter to the column player. If B = AT , where
AT is the transpose of A, the game is called symmetric. A mixed strategy for the row player is
a probability vector P ∈ Rn and a mixed strategy for the column player is a probability vector
Q ∈ Rm. The payoff to the row player of P against Q is P · AQ and that to the column player is
P ·BQ. Let us denote the space of probability vectors for the row player by P and the corresponding
space for the column player by Q. A Nash equilibrium of a 2-player game (A,B) is a pair of mixed
strategies P ∗ and Q∗ such that all unilateral deviations from these strategies are not profitable,
that is, for all P ∈ P and Q ∈ Q, we simultaneously have that
P ∗ ·AQ∗ ≥ P ·AQ∗
P ∗ · BQ∗ ≥ P ∗ · BQ.
Observe that if the bimatrix game is symmetric, the second inequality is redundant. Let (C,CT )
be a symmetric bimatrix game. If C is a symmetric matrix (that is, if CT = C), (C,CT ) is called a
doubly symmetric game or a coordination game. We are going to denote symmetric payoff matrices
by S. We call a Nash equilibrium strategy, say P ∗, symmetric, if (P ∗, P ∗) is an equilibrium.
2.2 Evolutionary stability
We are now ready to give the formal definition of an ESS.
Definition 1. Let (C,CT ) be a symmetric bimatrix game. We say that X∗ ∈ X is an ESS, if
∃O ⊆ X ∀X ∈ O/{X∗} : X∗ · CX > X · CX.
Here X is the space of mixed strategies of (C,CT ) (a simplex in Rn where n is the number of pure
strategies) and O is a neighborhood of X∗.
We note that an ESS is necessarily an isolated symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy in the sense
that no other symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy exists in a neighborhood of an ESS. We have
the following characterization of an ESS in doubly symmetric (coordination) games: Let f : X→ R
where X is a subset of Rn. Recall that X∗ ∈ X is a strict local maximum of f if there exists a
neighborhood O of X∗ such that, for all Y ∈ O/{X∗}, f(X∗) > f(Y ). Note further that a standard
quadratic program consists of finding maximizers of a quadratic form over the standard simplex.
Theorem 1. X∗ is an ESS of (S, S) if and only if X∗ is a strict local maximum of the standard
quadratic program
maximize
1
2
X · SX
subject to X ∈ X
where X is the simplex of mixed strategies of (S, S).
Theorem 1 is implicit in the literature as it amounts to a characterization of evolutionary
stability based on the well-known notion of strict local efficiency (cf. [Weibull, 1995, p. 56]).
2
3 Results
We have the following characterization of an ESS.
Lemma 1. X∗ is an ESS of (C,CT ) if and only if it is a strict local maximum of
1
2
Y · (C + CT )Y −X∗ · CY, Y ∈ X (1)
where X is the simplex in Rn and n is the size of C.
Proof. Straightforward from the definition of an ESS, and the elementary observations that
C =
1
2
(C + CT ) +
1
2
(C − CT )
and that since C − CT is skew-symmetric, Y · (C −CT )Y = 0 for all Y .
As a consequence of Lemma 1 we obtain the following immediate fact.
Lemma 2. The problem of detecting1 a strict local maximum of a standard quadratic program is
coNP-hard.
Proof. Etessami and Lochbihler [2008] and Nisan [2006] show that the problem of detecting an ESS
is coNP-complete. Since (1) can be readily brought into the form of a standard quadratic program
by a rank two update (cf. [Bomze, 1998]), the problem of detecting an ESS reduces (in the sense
of a Karp reduction) to the problem of detecting a strict local maximum of a standard quadratic
program in light of Lemma 1.
Theorem 2. The problem of detecting an ESS in a doubly symmetric bimatrix game is coNP-
complete.
Proof. In light of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, which together show that the problem of detecting an
ESS in a doubly symmetric game is coNP-hard, it suffices to show that the problem of detecting
an ESS in a doubly symmetric bimatrix game is in coNP. But this is a simple implication of the
fact that detecting an ESS in a symmetric bimatrix is coNP-complete [Etessami and Lochbihler,
2008, Nisan, 2006] and that the class of doubly symmetric bimatrix games is not but a subset of
the class of symmetric bimatrix games.
Theorem 2 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The problem of detecting an asymptotically stable equilibrium point of the continuous-
time replicator dynamic in a doubly symmetric game is coNP-complete.
Proof. In doubly symmetric bimatrix games, the notions of asymptotic stability under the replicator
dynamic and that of evolutionary stability coincide [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988].
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